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Abstract—Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the future of the 
cryptography world. The QKD was invented to increase the 
security rate when exchanging a private key. Since 1984, several 
experimental attempts to design protocols have been developed 
based upon the rule of physics. These QKD protocols were 
represented by different algorithms with limited ability to stand 
up against quantum attacks. This paper evaluates the most 
functional QKD protocols in the cryptography field and explains 
every QKD protocol as well illustrates the features that were 
utilized in each protocol. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 The security of data exchange between multiple parties is 
considered to be an extremely risky procedure. A secured data 
exchange system must be designed for scientists, governments, 
foundations, and the entire population. In order to guarantee the 
transfer of secured data by multiple parties, the data must be 
encrypted with a key that can only be identified by the sender 
(Alice) and the receiver (Bob). This encryption key is usually 
created by the sender, and it is submitted to the receiver through 
various communication channels. 
In classical cryptography, creating an encryption key is 
based on the complexity of the mathematical equations and the 
difficulty of solving these equations.  R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, 
and L. Adleman created the RSA [1], a well-known complex 
cryptanalysis algorithm. In addition, Shor’s algorithm [2] is 
considered to be one of the more robust algorithms in the 
classical and quantum security. It uses powerful calculation 
derived from number factors to increase the level of difficulty 
needed to access the generated key. Occasionally, Shor’s 
algorithm is used in the reconciliation and error correction 
phases. 
In classical cryptography, the secret key can be created by 
either the sender alone, the sender and the receiver, or the third 
party. In complicated procedures, the secret key should only be 
used once. In addition, the key should be adapted in certain 
protocols where the key contains an extraordinary amount of bits 
that may equal the length of the plain text. A secured key will 
ensure a safe method of transferring information between 
parties. The more complex the secured key, the safer the 
information transfer. So classical cryptography is the process 
that occurs within an unexpected amount of time through the 
execution of complex mathematical sequences. As a result, the 
researchers must constantly strive to improve communication 
security.   
II. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOLS 
The QKD protocol is the mechanism used to create a 
secret key through the law of physics and based on the 
fundamentals of digital and photon measurements. Several 
protocols were introduced to demonstrate reliable QKD 
protocols. Some QKD protocols have a reasonable ability to be 
processed and have withstood quantum attacks. In addition, 
QKD protocols can be applied through a current security 
systems [3]. These QKD protocols were designed in different 
schemes, and some of these protocols required specific devices. 
The following section briefly explains some interesting QKD 
protocols. 
A. The BB84 Protocol 
In 1984, Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard presented 
the first QKD protocol that depends on quantum mechanics. 
This protocol is called the BB84, and it utilizes the particularity 
of state polarization for creating the single qubit (Quantum Bit). 
The BB84 protocol employs two bases of measurements and 
four states of the photon polarization. 
 
|߮ۧ = ߙ|0ۧ ± ߚ|1ۧ, 
|∅ۧ = ߙ|0ۧ ± ߚ|1ۧ. 
In the history of quantum key distribution, there is no 
protocol similar to the BB84 protocol in the simplicity of the 
communication process. Although few researches have proven 
that the BB84 protocol is not secured, it is still theoretically 
used by several QKD protocols. 
 
B. The B92 Protocol 
In 1992, the B92 protocol was proposed by C. H. Bennett. 
The B92 protocol is similar to the BB84 protocol except the B92 
protocol uses two non-orthogonal states rather than four states. 
The B92 protocol also is based on the Heisenberg’s Uncertainty 
Principle [4]. The B92 protocol is explained as follows [5, 6]: 
 
 
 
• Alice starts creating n random qubits through two 
bases (×, +) and two non-orthogonal states. 
|0ۧ, |1ۧ, 
 
|−ۧ = (|0ۧ − |1ۧ)√2 , |+ۧ =
(|0ۧ + |1ۧ)
√2 .	 
 
• Bob measures the received qubits in random basis 
as shown below in Table (1): 
 
TABLE 1. THE EXCHANGE AND THE 
MEASUREMENT IN THE B92 PROTOCOL. 
Bob Bases × + 
Bob observed       
Alice sent   ?   ? 
 
• Bob communicates with Alice publically. 
• Bob must identify uncertain measurements to 
Alice, and Alice must omit them.  
The B92 protocol utilizes most of the BB84 scheme steps 
that are based upon the polarization of the states, but it takes a 
critical action when Bob measures Alice’s qubits in two bases 
to produce two states. 
 
C. The SARG04 Protocol 
This protocol was introduced [7] by V. Scarani, A. Acin, G. 
Ribordy and N. Gisin in 2004. The SARG04 is similar to the 
BB84 protocol except in the reconciliation and correcting errors 
phase. This protocol has proved to be secure protocol against a 
Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack. Based on current 
technology, a PNS attack is not likely to occur. The SARG04 
protocol is as follows: 
• Alice initiates random binary bits in non-orthogonal 
bases, and she submits the binary of qubits to Bob. 
• Bob measures the upcoming qubits in random bases, 
and he only gains the right measurement if he uses the 
bases that match with her qubits. 
• Alice announces Bob by two states; one state is that 
she already sent, and the other state is random states 
from other basis.        
The above QKD protocol was designed to improve the BB84 
protocol, and it provides an identical security to the BB84 
protocol in ideal implementations. However, the SARG04 
protocol is more secure when the PNS attack is presented.   
 
D. The Coherent-One-Way Protocol 
In 2008, the Coherent One Way (COW) protocol was presented 
by Nicolas Gisin, and other researchers. The COW protocol 
implements the secret key by the time of arrival measurements 
on the data line. The source, data, and monitoring lines are the 
sequential terms of the COW protocol [8]. Generally, the COW 
protocol’s algorithm is summarized as follows [9]: 
• Alice generates a string of bits that contains 0 and 1 
with the probability of	(1 − ݂)/2 , as well as sequence 
of decoy bits with a probability of f. 
• On the other hand, Bob measures the bits by two 
detectors: the first detector “DB” is for time and the 
second detector “DM2” is for security. 
• Bob reveals the bits after the measurement, where the 
number of bits can be detected by DB, and the time of 
detections will be monitored by DM2. 
• Alice reviews the sequences of bits and the detection 
time on the interferometer, and she is able to detect any 
eavesdropping on the submitted bits. 
• Alice informs Bob that the bits are needed must be 
removed from the string bits on Bob’s raw key. 
• Bob extracts the bits that will generate the secret key. 
 
E. The KMB09 Protocol 
The KMB09 was announced [10] by Muhammad Khan and 
others in 2009. The KMB09 differs from the BB84 protocol and 
other QKD protocols by detecting the presence of 
eavesdroppers that use the calculation of the index transmission 
error rate (ITER) instead of quantum bit error rate (QBER). The 
participants utilize two bases (e and f) with all states of both 
bases, and each bit will be transmitted only when the 
participants use different bases. Basically, the KMB09 
protocol’s algorithm scheme works as follows: 
• Alice initiates a string of random bits and assigns 
each single bit randomly into an index i = 1, 2 ... 
N. 
• Alice sends the prepared sequential bits to Bob into 
one of the states (e or f). 
• Bob utilizes the both states (e, f) to measure the 
upcoming qubits. 
• Alice informs Bob publicly of the submitted 
indices i. 
• Bob matches his measurements with Alice’s 
indices, and he keeps the matched bits and 
announces to Alice about the interrupted bits. 
• Alice and Bob must decide if the concluded secret 
key is eavesdropped by Eve when the error rate has 
high percentage or to keep the successful bits when 
the error rate is low. 
Therefore, Alice and Bob are able to reject the measured states 
that have the same index. 
 
F. The EPR Pair Paradox Protocol 
In 1935, the EPR Pair Paradox was presented in one of the 
interesting papers by A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen. 
The main notion of this paper [11] is to approve the certainty of 
entanglement elements. In 1991, Arther K. Ekert [5] came up 
with the EPR protocol based upon the previous theory. Ekerts’ 
theory states that when a pair of entangled qubits are measured, 
both qubits will collapse. The EPR protocol is explained in steps 
 
 
 
that will be between two communicators with ability to generate 
entangled qubits as follows: 
• Alice and Bob should be able to receive one of the 
entangled qubits, regardless of the initial receiver. 
• Alice and Bob measure the upcoming entangled 
qubits into a random sequence of bases that must 
be separated by both. 
• Alice and Bob communicate publically to compare 
the measured qubits, where they keep the qubits 
that were measured into same basis, and they 
discard the others. 
G. The Differential-Phase-Shifting Protocol 
The Differential Phase Shifting (DPS) Protocol was 
presented [12] by Kyo Inoue, et al., in 2002. The main premise 
of the DPS protocol is based on splitting the photon into a 
Three-Beam splitter with equal ratio, and then the submitted 
photons are recombined into two modulated phases.   
 
 
 
 
FIGURE (1). SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF DPS PROTOCOL. 
 
Alice modulates random pulses of weak coherent states by {0, 
π} for each pulse. After that Bob measures the upcoming pulses 
by using photon detector D1 and detector D2, in which these 
detectors click based on the arrival photons in different phases 
[13]. Then Bob informs Alice about the time that was counted 
at detectors.  The DPS protocol gives a robustness standing 
against a PNS attack. 
 
H. The S13 Protocol 
In 2013, S13 protocol [14] was introduced by Eduin H. Serna. 
This protocol was designed not to lose any information between 
the transfers of communication by two parties. The protocol’s 
mechanism is based on a random seed and asymmetric 
cryptography that are processed in multiple exchanges. The 
One-Time-Pad is guaranteed to be secured, as long as the secret 
key is random and contains the same length of the plain text. 
Therefore, the S13 protocol was designed to match the One-
Time-Pad by generating a secret key with zero losses. This 
protocol is similar to the BB84 protocol in quantum 
manipulations, however, it varies in using the private 
reconciliations, a Random Seed, and Asymmetric 
Cryptography. 
 
I. The AK15 Protocol 
The AK15 protocol [15] was presented in 2015 by A. Abushgra 
and K. Elleithy. The AK15 protocol employs the polarized n 
states into two bases, and it is based on the Heisenberg’s 
Uncertainty Principle. Also, the functionality of the preparation 
of the AK15 protocol is based on the power of the matrix, in 
which the prepared qubits are inserted into sequential lower-
triangle and upper-triangle. The upper-triangle is responsible to 
hold random qubits, and the lower-triangle is for the encrypted 
secret key that is needed to be shared between two participants. 
The AK15 protocol’s scheme is described in multiple steps as 
follows: 
• Alice initiates a communication into EPR channel to 
create an authentication key (many steps included 
[15]). 
• The authentication key must have the encoding 
process through the quantum channel such as the size 
of the matrix, sorting rows, and the initiation time. 
• Alice fills up the lower-triangle (data) and the upper-
triangle (random qubits), and she resorts the rows 
based on the authentication key. 
• Alice sends the sequence of qubit rows in identified 
time, known length, and its indices. 
• Bob measures the upcoming qubits, and he knows the 
size of used matrix. He uses the parity cells to check if 
there were any interruptions or not. 
• Bob makes a decision to accept the communication if 
the QBER is over 90%. If the QBER is below 90%, 
Bob can reject the communication and restart another 
one.  
 
 
FIGURE (2) SHOWS THE GENERAL AK15 PROTOCOL SCHEME. 
 
III. THE COMPARISONS OF QKD PROTOCOLS  
The QKD protocols were compared based on the 
features of the protocol being secure or un-secure as follows 
in the Table (2). Most QKD protocols were classified based 
on the observables and quantum measurements, which make 
a decision to choose what kind of measuring and detecting 
devices will use. Using different states into the measurable 
channel will certainly determine the measurement system 
that each participant has to have. Also, Decoy states are 
mostly convenient to prevent some quantum attacks such as 
IRA.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table [2] THE COMPARISON BETWEEN COMMON QKD PROTOCOLS. 
 
Cases Quantum Key Distribution Protocols 
BB84 B92 SARG04 COW KMB09 EPR DPS S13 AK15 
Properties Heisenberg Heisenberg Heisenberg Entanglement Heisenberg Entanglement Entanglement Heisenberg Heisenberg 
Number of States 4 states 2 States 4 States Time slots 2 states Entangled 2 
of photons 
4 States 4 States n states 
Detection of presence QBER QBER QBER Break of 
coherence 
ITER Bell’s 
inequality 
Time-
instance 
Ran. Seed 
Asymmetric 
QBER + 
Parity Cell 
Polarization Situation 2 orthogonal 1 non-
orthogonal 
coded bits No, using 
DPS 
No No 4 non-
orthogonal 
2 orthogonal 2 Orthogonal 
Probability of each 
state 
Various 50% 50% equal 50% equal equal Various Various  
Qubit case DV DV DV DV DV DV DV DV DV 
Classical channels Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Decoy States No No No Yes No No No No Yes 
Sifting phase Revealing 
Bases 
Alice = 
1 - Bob 
Revealing 
non-orth. 
state 
revealing the 
times 2k+1 
determining 
the error rate 
Bell's 
Inequality 
No Revealing 
Bases 
No 
Bell's inequality No No No No No Yes No No Yes 
PNS attack Vulnerable Vulnerable It's better 
than BB84 
Robust Robust N/A Robust N/A Robust 
IRUD attack Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Under Test Under Test Vulnerable N/A N/A Robust 
Beam-Splitting attack Vulnerable Vulnerable Robust Robust Robust Vulnerable Robust N/A Robust 
Denial of Service attack Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Robust N/A N/A 
Man-In-The-Middle 
attack 
Vulnerable Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust N/A Robust 
IRA attack Vulnerable Vulnerable Robust Robust Robust Bell's 
inequality 
Robust N/A Robust 
These information were collected from different resources (journals, articles and conference papers) and whole information and data above are based on either the 
original studies or the latest improvement. Also, this paper focused on just nine of the most famous protocols that will be the foundation of quantum computer world. 
Furthermore, some of the details have been received from the original publication where it was not studied more than one or two; On the other hand, others were 
had the details from different studies such as BB84, which has plenty of studies in different approaches. 
 
 
According to the previous table, the classical channel is used 
mainly in the executing time of each protocol except the AK15 
protocol. Moreover, correcting the errors that might happen 
naturally by environment or by eavesdropper is the core of the 
whole communication and exchanging data. Some quantum 
protocols just use the QBER, which is still an inaccurate 
correction system. Few of these protocols employ a strong 
algorithm to prevent any gaining to the submitted data by 
eavesdropper such COW, KMB09, and AK15 protocol. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 This paper identified a group of QKD protocols that are 
classified as the most practical and usable QKD protocols. 
These studied protocols were analyzed into a specific 
cryptographic field to show the robustness of each one of these 
protocols. The main point in this paper focused on the 
comparison between QKD protocols that are based on a 
technical side of cryptography. The study shows some QKD 
protocols that are reliable and secure against some quantum 
attacks but their devices are not available nowadays. On the 
other hand, other QKD protocols have the ability to be 
processed into a classical system but their security is still under 
test. Thus, the combination of physics features together with 
mathematics rules cover a huge gap between the classical and 
the quantum cryptography. 
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